University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Reviews

Faculty Scholarship

1989

Review of Family and State: The Philosophy of Family Law
Carl E. Schneider

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/168

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schneider, Carl E. Review of Family and State: The Philosophy of Family Law, By Lawrence D. Houlgate.
Family Law Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1989): 489-493.

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Book Review
Family and State: The Philosophy
of Family Law

Lawrence D. Houlgate
Rowman & Littlefield.
Totowa, New Jersey (1988).
207 pages.
CARLE. SCHNEIDER*

In Family and State: The Philosophy of Family Law, Professor Houlgate
sets out to "introduc[ e] ... a new subject area in philosophy that [I] call
'the philosophy of family law.' " 1 He defines that area as "the discipline
that is concerned to present general normative principles or criteria and
to apply these to ethical questions about laws that affect or concern the
family." 2 He directs the book to legal scholars, social philosophers, philosophers of law, legislators, laymen, and students.
The first third of Family and State expounds some theoretical bases for
analyzing family law. In this section, Professor Houlgate announces his
philosophical perspective: hedonist act utilitarianism. He offers his definition of "family": "two or more persons constitute a family in case at
least one of them is a child and the other is a child-rearer who permanently
resides with the child, who has the responsibility ofproviding for the child's
needs, and who has certain rights over the child. " 3 He proposes a normative
model of the family as a "community": like a community (and unlike an
"organization"), the family does not have goals, it cannot be said to act
or make decisions, and the rights and responsibilities of its members arise
not from contract or shared goals but from "the internal relationship of
'being a family member.' " 4 Like the members of a community, family
*Carl E. Schneider is a professor at the University of Michigan School of Law.
I. HOULGATE, L. FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY LAW xii (1988).
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
4. Id. at 37.
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members owe each other a duty of benevolence and have a right to the
benevolence of the other members whether they "deserve" it or not.
To the communal model of the family, Professor Houlgate opposes the
"organic" and the "individualistic" models. In the organic model, "each
family member exists to serve the needs of the family instead of attending
primarily to his own needs, for he has no needs or desires that are conceptually distinct from those of the family itself." 5 Despite some similarities, the organic model differs from the communal models, since in the
latter family members are moral equals, while "the organic model of the
family is opposed to the notion of moral equality. It asserts instead the
subordination of the individual family member to the family itself." 6 The
organic model, because it exalts the good of the family, is frequently
associated with a hierarchically ordered family. The individualistic model,
on the other hand, sees the family as "composed of elements, discrete
individuals, who are basically complete apart from the family." 7 Like a
business partnership, this family is used to satisfy its member's individual
needs, and its members abandon it as soon as it ceases to serve that
function. Like the communal model, the individualistic model sees the
members of the family as moral equals.
Professor Houlgate concludes this first section of the book by arguing
that both the family and family law are morally justifiable. The family
finds its justification not only in its function in rearing children, but in
the family's provision of benevolence and the psychological satisfactions
benevolence brings its members. Family law finds its justification in reducing the uncertainties and inequalities that would be associated with
conjugal relationships without rules, in allowing society to prevent overpopulation and genetically dangerous reproduction, in eliminating uncertainty about who has custody of children, and in deterring harm to
children. The particular content of family law, of course, is to be determined by asking what rules will optimize human happiness. This inquiry
is to be assisted by consulting the middle-range principle of optimum
community benefit: "we are to . . . prefer the law that has the most
beneficial effect on the ability of families to function as communities." 8
The remainder of Family and State is intended to explicate the principles laid out in the first third of the book and to demonstrate their
usefulness by applying them to a series of family law problems. The series
is long, so I will give only a few examples. Professor Houlgate advocates
a "two-track system of conjugal partnership arrangements," 9 such that
couples who do not intend to have children could arrange by contract all
the incidents of their relationship, while couples intending to have chil5. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.

at 51.
(emphasis in original).
at 52.
at 49.
at 72.
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dren would be limited to contracts of indefinite duration providing for
the parties to live together, be monogamous, and share responsibility for
raising their children. He advocates abolishing the spouse's privilege not
to have the other spouse testify against him. He argues that everyone
should have the right to use contraception, that married women should
have the right to an abortion, and that parents should have the right to
decide (subject to an unidentified mechanism to prevent abuse of the
right) whether their seriously defective newborn children should be given
medical treatment. He would establish a presumption that natural parents
have custody of their children, but he would allow the presumption to be
rebutted where there is a surrogate mother contract or where the natural
parent has not been the custodial parent. He would allow the state to
intervene to protect children from their parents only where the children
are suffering or likely to suffer certain severe harms.
I could not be more enthusiastic about the project Professor Houlgate
has undertaken. As I wrote some years ago, family law has suffered from
the failure of its students to attempt generalizing and theoretical work
and from its failure to recruit help from other disciplines. 10 And there are
few disciplines from which help would be more welcome than philosophy.
Therefore, I earnestly wish I could be more enthusiastic about the success
of Professor Houlgate's project. Most unhappily, however, this book accomplishes neither its own ambitious aims nor the more modest hopes
its readers might have for it.
The difficulties begin at the most basic level: the reader is left doubting
that the author has mastered the basics of contemporary American family
law. We are flatly told, to take a specific instance, that forty-two states
have common-law marital property systems and that eight have community property systems. 11 Professor Houlgate seems to be unaware of
the modern importance of equitable distribution doctrine. The book's
descriptions and analyses of cases repeatedly raise questions about the
care and understanding with which the cases were read. The author's sense
of what is important is also disquieting. For example, he spends as much
time on the uncontroversial and uninteresting question of whether wives
should have to take their husbands' names and domiciles as he does on
the complex and critical question of how marital property should be
divided.
Family and State's second problem is that it is largely derivative. The
reader rarely encounters an unfamiliar idea and will too often encounter
discussions which draw preponderantly on what courts and commentators
have already said. Much of the material on child abuse and neglect, for
example, does little more than echo the work of Michael Wald and the
I 0. Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family
Law, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1039 (1985). I should say that much recent scholarship is moving
in just these directions.
11. HOULGATE, L., supra note I, at 68.
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IJA/ABA Standards Relating to Coercive State Intervention on Behalf of
Endangered (Neglected and Abused) Children and Voluntary Placements
of Children.
Yet, even while the book is derivative, the author shows little familiarity
with much of the literature on family law. This presumably contributes
to the book's third problem-its superficiality. The reader regularly is left
wondering how the author would answer the many questions crucial to
the book's arguments that the literature raises but the author does not.
Perhaps the problem is simply that the author has attempted to deal with
complex issues in too short a space. But often the problem is that the
author appears to find easy problems that many people find hard. Thus
Professor Houlgate says dismissively, "[w]e can easily see that the states
ought not to interfere with abortion decisions in most circumstances and
that statutes such as the one [in Roe v. Wade] are morally indefensible." 12
One problem a philosopher must confront in discussing family law
(particularly when, as here, the philosopher chooses to analyze specific
family law issues) is the complexity of the relevant social facts and the
inadequacy of our information about them. Family and State's fourth
difficulty is its often casual approach to this problem. Consider, for example, its proposal that mediation or therapy be substituted for adjudication of child custody disputes between divorcing parents:
In the absence of a third party to assign custody, the parents will together
attempt to reach their own solution through discussion and compromise, or
through achieving an integration of their personalities. If this occurs, damaging conflict can be kept to a minimum. The evidence gathered from divorce
arbitration over the last fifteen years shows that this hope has been largely
realized. 13

The first sentence of this quotation is purely speculative and quite questionable. The third sentence is unfootnoted, so the reader is left uncertain
just what evidence Professor Houlgate refers to and whether that evidence
in fact speaks, for example, to situations in which parties are coerced into
mediation or therapy by the unavailability of adjudication. 14 Empirical
problems likewise bedevil the next stage of Professor Houlgate's proposal,
which is that where mediation fails, joint custody be automatically imposed. Professor Houlgate's text and footnotes simply do not grapple with
the obvious question of how those parents who have been unable to agree
to a custody arrangement and who have resisted mediation and therapy
are going to share decisions about raising their children.
The book's attempt to devise and discuss different models of the family
that the law might use is potentially invaluable. Those models raise, for
12. Id.
13. ld. at 130.

14. For a less sanguine view of the evidence to which Professor Houlgate is probably
referring, see the excellent article by Teitelbaum & DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1093 (1988).
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example, such useful questions as whether the law can and should treat
the family as an entity and, more significantly, what (if any) normative
view of the family the law should consult. An insightful literature about
these questions is now beginning to develop. However, Family and State's
organic and individualistic models, which are apparently intended to describe views of the family that are actually and centrally held in today's
discussions of family law, are so roughly and unsympathetically drawn
that discussions of them are frustratingly unprofitable. The communal
model which Professor Houlgate prefers is oddly scanted; the reader is
supposed to be persuaded of its usefulness not by direct argument for it,
but rather by Professor Houlgate's demonstration through his discussions
of particular family law issues that the other two models are unsatisfactory
or are satisfactory only insofar as they share elements of the communal
model. Consequently, the fascinating questions about what that model
means and how the law might try to use it are largely submerged.
Finally, Family and State's clumsy use ofutilitarianism makes the reader
understand what drove John Stuart Mill into a depression and the arms
of Wordsworth. That doctrine's classic problems are widely apparent in
the book. For example, since the author frequently concludes his discussion of an issue by simply announcing that one set of interests outweighs
the other, the reader is frequently left puzzled about how the utilitarian
calculus has been performed.
Let me close by saying what I hope does not need to be said, that Family
and State's drawbacks do not prove that its enterprise is not worth attempting. Readers interested in pursuing the insights of philosophy into
the issues Family and State discusses may profitably read, to take a few
examples, Jeffrey Blustein, Parents and Children: The Ethics ofthe Family
(1982); Phillip Abbot, The Family on Trial: Special Relationships in Modern Political Thought (1981 ); and Joel Feinberg's four-volume series, The
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1984-88).

